Table Of ContentSUFFERING AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
OXFORD ETHICS SERIES
Series Editor: Derek Parfit, All Souls College, Oxford
The Limits of Morality
Shelly Kagan
Perfectionism
Thomas Hurka
Inequality
Larry S. Temkin
Morality, Mortality, Volume 1
Death and Whom to Save from It
F. M. Kamm
Morality, Mortality, Volume II
Rights, Duties, and Status
F. M. Kamm
Suffering and Moral Responsibility
Jamie Mayerfeld
S U F F E R I NG
A ND M O R AL
R E S P O N S I B I L I TY
Jamie Mayerfeld
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Copyright © 1999 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
First published in 1999 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
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First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 2002
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Mayerfeld, Jamie.
Suffering and moral responsibility / Jamie Mayerfeld.
p. cm. — (Oxford ethics series)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-19-511599-6; ISBN 0-19-515495-9 (pbk.)
1. Suffering—Moral and ethical aspects. 2. Responsibility.
I. Title. II. Series.
BJ1409.M28 1999
179—dc21 98-19813
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
For my parents,
Ernest Mayerfeld and Marilyn Mayerfeld,
and my friend,
Morris Jackson
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Preface
The world knows an immense amount of suffering, much of it humanly inflicted
and much of it humanly preventable. My book seeks to shed light on the moral
dimensions of this fact. Ultimately, it aims to clarify the nature of the duty to relieve
suffering, and to encourage reflection on the kinds of changes that would be nec-
essary to bring our lives into adequate compliance with this duty.
I have brooded on these matters for a long time. From an early age I enjoyed
many wide-ranging and eye-opening conversations with Morris Jackson, who
greeted my views with good-natured skepticism and subjected them to steady cri-
tique. My parents, with whom I began to share my thoughts around the same time,
reacted with something closer to alarm. I have learned much from their protests,
and I owe more than I can say to their unceasing love, encouragement, and support.
To them and to Morris, I dedicate this book.
I thank the professors at Oberlin College who introduced me to moral and po-
litical philosophy. In my sophomore year, I wrote on my own initiative what I
fancied to be a definitive discussion of the duty to relieve suffering. Norman Care
read it, gave me detailed comments, and suggested that I might benefit from actually
studying philosophy. His course on "Philosophy and Values" was a revelation. I
also learned from the superlative teaching of Alfred MacKay, who wisely devoted
a course to Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, and Harlan Wilson, who did his best to
teach me some political theory.
This work first took shape as a doctoral dissertation in politics at Princeton
University. I owe an enormous debt to my advisors, Alan Ryan and George Kateb,
for expert guidance at the start, middle, and end of the dissertation project. Both
were sympathetic to the undertaking, but warned me to abandon some of my more
foolish ideas. I heeded their advice in some instances, and may come to regret that
viii PREFACE
I did not do so in others. Their wisdom, learning, and generosity are a continuing
source of inspiration.
My greatest debt is to Derek Parfit. Derek took an early interest in my manu-
script, and treated draft after draft to wonderfully detailed and penetrating com-
ments. Reading Derek's comments was an education in itself, and it is hard to
convey the pleasure I felt in absorbing a wealth of insights into the very issues that
had so long occupied my attention. The pleasure was not unmixed with fear, since
I was sure I could never meet the challenges Derek continually threw in my direc-
tion. I never did meet them adequately, but I tried my best, and the effort led to a
greatly improved manuscript. Derek encouraged me to think I could fulfill his high
expectations, and for this I shall always be grateful.
Jeff McMahan and Larry S. Temkin, who reviewed the manuscript for Oxford
University Press, saved me from many errors, and their suggestions for recasting
the discussion proved extremely helpful. Jeff went far beyond the call of duty by
supplying a second round of detailed comments on a subsequent draft.
To Amy Gutmann I am grateful for early advice and encouragement. To Dennis
McKerlie I am indebted for an invaluable conversation over e-mail on the moral
asymmetry of happiness and suffering, and to Clancy Bailey for a similarly beneficial
e-mail conversation on the role of intuitions in moral reasoning. Amy, Dennis, and
Clancy all gave me valuable feedback on the manuscript at different stages of its
completion. At the University of Washington, I have enjoyed the continuing guid-
ance of my colleague from the Department of Philosophy, Bill Talbott. Bill lavished
careful comments on repeated drafts, and has greatly enhanced my understanding
of the methods and limits of moral philosophy.
For enlightening discussions on pain and pain measurement, I am indebted to
Dr. Mark Jensen, Dr. John Loeser, and Dr. Mark Sullivan, all members of the
world-famous research community on pain relief at the University of Washington.
Several other people generously set aside time to comment on full or partial
drafts of my book, or to discuss specific issues with me in person, or both. The
results of their criticisms, suggestions, insights, and questions appear in innumerable
places, and I am profoundly grateful to them. They include Brom Anderson, Ran-
dolph Clarke, Christine Di Stefano, Stephen E. Hanson, Richard Hare, Greg Hill,
Thomas Hurka, Frank Jackson, John Goldberg, Frances Kamm, Elizabeth Kiss,
Joel Kupperman, Cliff Landesman, Margaret Mack, Michael McCann, Jean Rob-
erts, Paul Sigmund, Peter Singer, Martin Tweedale, Mark van Roojen, Paul Vogt,
and Alan Wertheimer. I thank any others who belong on this list and whose names
I unintentionally omit.
I am fortunate to have received able assistance from the many talented people at
Oxford University Press. Matthew Diamond came to my rescue by correcting the
page proofs with remarkable care and skill.
I thank the support of my departmental colleagues, especially Christine Di Ste-
fano, Nancy Hartsock, Michael McCann, and Michael Taylor. I also thank succes-
sive department chairs—Donald McCrone, Lance Bennett, and Michael McCann—
for help in arranging research time.
PREFACE ix
For their unflagging support, cheerful encouragement, and indispensable advice
over many years, I thank my sister and brother-in-law, Diane Mayerfeld and
Michael Bell, and my friends Luis Corteguera, Patrick Dobel, Morris B. Kaplan,
Donna Kerr, and Cynthia Steele. I thank my partner, Peter Mack, for all these
things, and also for the unexpected gift of happiness.
My heartfelt thanks to Robert Amdur and Kathie Jenni for correcting some
embarrassing mistakes in time for the paperback edition.
Parts of the following discussion appeared in "The Moral Asymmetry of Hap-
piness and Suffering," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1996): 317-38.
Description:In this original study, Jamie Mayerfeld undertakes a careful inquiry into the meaning and moral significance of suffering. Understanding suffering in hedonistic terms as an affliction of feeling, he addresses difficulties associated with its identification and measurement. He then turns to an examin
