Korean War Almanac

609 Pages·2006·8.35 MB·English

ALMANACS OF AMERICAN WARS
oo
K W A
OR EAN AR LMANAC
Paul M.Edwards
Dedicated to Gregg Edwards:friend,colleague,son.
Ifthe best minds in the world had set out to find us the worst possible
location in the world to fight this damnable war,politically and
militarily,the unanimous choice would have been Korea!
—Dean Acheson
Quoted in Michael E.Hass,In the Devil’s Shadow
(Annapolis,Md.:Naval Institute Press),p.1.
Korean War Almanac
Copyright © 2006 by Paul M.Edwards
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Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Edwards,Paul M.
Korean War almanac / Paul M.Edwards—1st ed.
p.cm.—(Almanacs ofAmerican wars) Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8160-6037-1 (hardcover :alk.paper)
1.Korean War,1950–1953—Chronology.2.Korean War,1950–1953.3.Korean War,
1950–1953—United States.4.United Nations—Armed Forces—Korea I.Title II.Series.
DS918.E365 2008
951.904'2—dc22 2005009374
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C
o ONTE NTS
Preface v
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction ix
Chronology 1
Biographies 454
Weapons 492
Participation 512
Glossary,Abbreviations,Designations,and Terms 529
Appendices
I.MEDALOFHONORWINNERSINKOREA 533
II.UNITEDNATIONSSENIORMILITARYCOMMANDERS 537
III.U.S.SHIPSSUNKORDAMAGED 540
IV.GROUNDTROOPCOMMITMENTBYNATION 543
V.COMBATSORTIESBYMISSION 544
VI.ACESOFTHEKOREANWAR 545
MAPS 548
Bibliography 562
Index 572
P
o R E FAC E
Most ofthose involved in the Korean War,whether in the military or the political
arena,seem to feel that it was the wrong war.While both the decision to go to war
and the interpretation ofwhat happened during the war will be argued for decades
to come,it is clear that it was a war that America was not prepared to fight,either
psychologically or militarily.Coming as it did so close to the victories ofWorld War
II,it was a war that America did not want.At the same time,pressed with a fear of
the expansion ofcommunism and well aware ofthe increasing role played by the
United States in international affairs,it was a war the administration ofPresident
Harry S.Truman believed had to be fought.And,as it turned out,it was a highly sig-
nificant war.In many respects it was a watershed in the flow ofboth American and
international history.
Today,after more than a half-century,it is still difficult to understand all that
happened during the Korean War.Arguments continue among respected histori-
ans about the causes,the fighting,and the outcome ofthe war and most certainly
about the legacy ofthe war.New information that has become available from the
archives of our onetime enemies has shed new light on our inquiries and some-
times provided new evidence for our established theories.To those studying the
cold war (when it was important enough to be capitalized),the outcome of the
Korean War often seems to be more interesting and significant than the war itself.
Most ofus,however,without acknowledging the source ofthe condition,live out
our lives in the shadow of decisions made and goals accomplished during those
often desperate days.
Since the 1950–53 conflict,the United States as well as the rest ofthe world has
been involved in many struggles.The blood ofthe men and women ofmany nations
has soaked the earth in the defense ofinternational peace and the pursuit oflocal-
ized ideologies.Americans continue to fight and die in the continuation ofnational
policies established and doctrines accepted during the days ofthe Korean War.
Veterans ofthe Korean War do not seem to speak out as much as other veter-
ans. They call their war the “Forgotten War.” They do not hold as many unit
reunions;they do not produce a lot ofunit newsletters.They have not written as
many memoirs,novels,poems,or songs to commemorate their service.They are not
inclined to identify themselves as quickly by personal automobile plates or stickers
in car windows.The reason for this behavior is one ofmany questions that remain
about the war.But when seeing the extent ofthis conflict laid out on a daily basis,it
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is possible to recognize the American commitment and the personal courage that
appear day after day.
We still do not know a great deal about the war.Some parts ofit seem immune
to inquiry and understanding.The war was a very complex venture at an extremely
complicated time in American and world history.The simple answers provided by
orthodox and revisionist historians do not always apply. Often called a “police
action,”a “conflict,”the “Korean Question,”a “limited action,”“Truman’s War,”the
“war before Vietnam,”and traditionally the “forgotten war,”the action in the Korean
War was warlike.It was a war in every sense and meaning ofthe word.It embraced
all the political turmoil,the national pride,the military aggression,the dying,and
the suffering that are reflected in any war.
It was not,however,a popular war,nor was it a war that most persons,certainly
most Americans,really understood.Following on the heels ofthe vastly popular and
dramatically concluded World War II—during which nearly every American was
deeply and personally involved—events in Korea seemed an unwelcome breech of
a peace so dearly bought.The coming ofthe war was an interruption in the eco-
nomic growth ofthe nation and an inconvenience to those who were called upon
to fight once again and so quickly.The war was not personally felt by most other
Americans.The draft,weakened by an elaborate deferment system,left the burden
to only a few,generally lower-income families.There was no rationing and few
shortages to be faced.Nothing happened,or was attempted,to impress on the Amer-
ican people the seriousness ofwhat was occurring in that distant Asian nation.Later,
the war in Korea was lost in the military and political turmoil ofthe growing con-
flict in Vietnam,and its memory faded quickly from the American mind.
There is still a great deal to be learned from the Korean War,as well as about
the war.It was a war that was waged on land,at sea,and in the air.It was a war of
combined operations,ofmilitary unpreparedness,offierce controversies and pro-
longed negotiations.It was a war that reflected much ofthe major confrontation
between the Free World and the communist world—between East and West.It wit-
nessed a significant shift in American policy and strategy.And,it was a war during
which limited objectives became both necessary and advantageous.
A
o C KNOWLE DG M E NTS
I wish to acknowledge the major sources used for this work.Because ofthe scope of
the task and the wide variety ofentries,it has been necessary to rely heavily on many
secondary sources from which the bulk ofthe information presented here has been
gleaned.The last few years have seen an increase in the scholarly work done,and a
growth in the materials produced,about the Korean War.But there is still a consid-
erable limitation as to what is available.In comparison to the information now on-
hand about World War II,or even about the more debated war in Vietnam,the
number ofsources remains small.There are not yet nearly enough ofthe monographs
or narrative histories that are so important to the researcher.But fortunately there
have been some excellent documentary works,as well as official histories produced
in the last decade or so.A large number ofbooks,articles,and papers have been ref-
erenced in the Almanac,and they are referenced in the attached bibliography.Some
sources,however,require special mention.These are Kathryn Weathersby,coeditor,
Cold War International History Project Bulletin(Korean Initiative);Walter G.Hermes,
Truce Tent and Fighting Front(Office ofthe ChiefofMilitary History,1988);Roy E.
Appleman,South to the Naktong,North to the Yalu(ChiefofMilitary History,1960);
Donald Knox,The Korean War: Uncertain Victory(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1988);
David Rees,The Limited War(1964);Lee Ballenger,The Outpost War: U.S.Marines
in Korea,1953(Brassey,2001);Lee Ballenger,Final Crucible: U.S.Marines in Korea,
1952(Brassey,2000);Charles Whiting,Battleground Korea: The British in Korea(Sut-
ton,2003);Ted Barris;Deadlock in Korea: Canadians at War,1950–1953(Macmil-
lan,1999);William C.Russell,The Days at White Horse (Arlington,1988);Lynn
Montross and Nicholas A.Canzona,U.S.Marine Operations in Korea,5 vol.(Histor-
ical Branch,1954–72);T.R.Fehrenbach,This Kind ofWar(Brassey,2000 ed.);James
I.Matray,Historical Dictionary ofthe Korean War(Greenwood Press,1991);Roy E.
Appleman,Escaping the Trap(Texas A & M University Press,1990);Roy E.Appleman,
Disaster in Korea(Texas A & M University Press,1989);Billy C.Mossman,Ebb and
Flow: November 1950–July 1951(Center ofMilitary History,1990);James A.Field,
Jr.,History ofUnited States Naval Operations,Korea(1962);and The Marines in the
Korean War Commemorative Series,published during the 50th anniversary of the
Korean War.This series,written by reliable historians from primary sources,is an
excellent tool for anyone studying the war,but the various titles lack an index.Also
of considerable value is the series of pamphlets produced by the United States
of America Korean War Commemoration Committee (U.S. Army). Also to be
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mentioned,with thanks,are the individual contributors,with offerings in dictio-
naries and encyclopedias;among these I would acknowledge the contributions of
Clay Blair,Stanley Sandler,Allen Millett,James Matray,and Roger Dingman.
Among the primary sources consulted were those found at the archive and
library at the Center for the Study ofthe Korean War,located at Graceland Univer-
sity’s campus in Independence,Missouri;Central Plains Region National Archives
and Records Administration (Kansas City,Missouri);the Dwight D.Eisenhower
Presidential Library (Abilene,Kansas);the Harry S.Truman Presidential Museum
and Library (Independence,Missouri);and the Allied Forces Command and Staff
College Library (Fort Leavenworth,Kansas).Appreciation is also expressed for the
librarians and staffofthe University ofMissouri at Kansas City and ofPark Uni-
versity,in Parkville,Missouri.Special thanks to the staff and administration of
Graceland University,essentially to those at the Independence campus,where so
often the seeds ofinquiry grow into blossoms ofunderstanding.And to the history
faculty at Graceland University,even to those who do not think it is important.
For aid in the work-up ofthe photographs used I am most grateful for the help
ofLisa Hecht ofthe Center for the Study ofthe Korean War.Special thanks go to
Megan Bethel for help with the maps and to Joni Wilson for her professional eye.
Personal acknowledgment goes to my long-suffering wife,Carolynn;to Paula,
Jeff,Gregg,DeAnne,Alison,Courtney,Megan,and McKenzie,now all delightful
adults.Thanks to colleagues and friends Lisa Hecht,Leroy (Jack) Eller,Judith Charl-
ton,Greg Smith,Cindy Roberts,and Nancy Eisler.And,ofcourse,to Bailey,who is
never absent.
I
o NTRODUCTION
The war in Korea (1950–53) is perhaps best understood if recognized as being
fought in four phases.Each phase is fairly distinct.Initially,following the North
Korean invasion ofSouth Korea,there was a period ofretreat in the face ofover-
whelming odds.The Communist drive was met with increasing resistance as first
the Republic ofKorea Army and then the United States and finally United Nations
(UN) forces,began to fight back.Yet even after the effort was boosted by the polit-
ical and military support of many nations, the United Nations Command was
forced to withdraw in the face ofthe aggressive enemy.Soon the UN was driven
inside a defensive perimeter running in an arc some 28 miles inland from the port
city ofPusan.There the Eighth Army held fast in the southeasternmost part ofthe
beleaguered nation.
The second phase is represented by the dramatic end-around accomplished when
General Douglas MacArthur’s X Corps landed at the port of Inchon,caught the
North Korean Army unprepared,cut offits supplies,and began a drive north.At the
same time,Eighth Army broke free from the desperate defense at Pusan and moved
north to join with X Corps,after which the two units pushed inland.The North
Korean Communist forces were driven back across the 38th parallel.At this point
the United Nations halted only briefly.Then the decision was made to complete the
job by crossing the arbitrary division between the Koreas.The objective was to
destroy the North Korean Army and return all ofKorea to UN control.From the
38th parallel the United Nations Command began its move toward the Manchurian
border at the Yalu River.The North Korean Army was initially shattered by the drive
ofthe attacking forces and moved ever northward.In late October,troops ofthe
advancing army reached their northernmost point,some even to the Yalu River.By
November 1950,a conclusion to the war appeared imminent.The efforts to unite
the Korean people under one government—friendly to the United States—seemed
to be near fulfillment.
The third phase ofthe war began when soldiers ofthe Chinese People’s Libera-
tion Army—defined by the Chinese as volunteers—crossed the Yalu River and inter-
vened in the war.The massive impact of these combat-seasoned Chinese troops
caught the United Nations offguard and turned the once proud advance into a mas-
sive retreat.The UN forces were driven back,both on the east coast,where X Corps
was caught at the Chosin Reservoir,and on the west coast,where Eighth Army was
involved in a widespread withdrawal.The Chinese soldiers who poured into Korea
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