MacKenzie, Alison (2013) Emotions and education

257 Pages·2013·1.5 MB·English

by  Frances Gaughan

MacKenzie, Alison (2013) Emotions and education: cultivating
compassionate minds. PhD thesis.

http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3844/

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Glasgow Theses Service
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Emotions and Education: Cultivating Compassionate Minds.

Alison MacKenzie (MA Hons, MPhil)

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Education
College of Social Sciences
University of Glasgow
July 2012
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Abstract
This thesis is primarily a philosophical exploration of emotions. From a feminist, liberal
perspective, I focus on the cultivation of morally appropriate emotions, particularly
compassion, in education. My central claim is that emotions are essential elements of
human intelligence and wellbeing. They are complex responses to events of significance to
us and, because emotions play a central role in our lives, they help to define who we are
and why we are as we are; they are expressions of our values and what we value. Emotions
can motivate us to action, and so we need, if we want just institutions, to ensure that those
actions are ethical and proportionate. On the view that emotions can be rational, and that
they result from eudaimonistic judgements, if we want a society of healthy human beings
who have concern for others, who know how to treat others fairly and sensitively, how to
take action when things go wrong, then we need to attend, I argue here, to emotional health
in education. We should aim to habituate the emotional capacities of all individuals as an
enduring resource of good character. At issue, is how to educate young people to have
healthy emotions that are ethical, proportionate, discerning and deliberative, that have
ethical action as their goals, and which do not negatively discriminate on the basis of
gender.
In the development of emotional wellbeing and moral character, compassion is an emotion
that merits particular attention. Such is the potential ethical power of this emotion, that I
propose compassion to be the arch-guardian of the moral domain and, accordingly, a
prerequisite for the cultivation of moral sentiment and respect for human dignity. A
consideration of emotions will raise questions about who should feel, how we should feel,
when, and to what extent, emotions such as compassion, sympathy or anger in acceptable
and appropriate ways. I argue, too, that we should attend to the how and why of
interpreting these emotions. Whilst a number of analyses reveal how powerful emotional
interpretations are in stigmatising, labeling or stereotyping men and women, rarely, if ever,
are questions raised in education about the assumptions on which gendered emotions rest. I
respond here by proposing that if education is to serve a role in the cultivation of morally
appropriate emotions, then we must question, and should no longer accept, gendered
emotions, that is emotions that belong to, or are more ‘natural’ for one sex than another.
Acknowledging the importance of care for wellbeing, I question the claims of some care
ethicists who would have us believe that care does not require moral theory and that it is
not an issue of justice. I assert, to the contrary, that unless an ethics of care rests on sound
moral and conceptual constructs, it will perpetuate a bifurcation of emotion and reason
whilst sustaining stereotypically gendered emotions. In order to illuminate my argument
for the cultivation of de-gendered, just emotions, I draw upon empirical research on the
effects of deformed emotional attitudes towards women and children which seriously
impede their wellbeing and functioning. I draw, too, on novels, both for the
exemplification of my arguments and as a vehicle which, creatively and sensitively used,
can help us to shape our imaginative and empathic capacities to take into the folds of our
consciousness people who are both similar to and remote and different from us.
I am accompanied throughout the thesis by a fictional pupil ‘Nancy’ with and through
whom I exculpate complex theoretical and philosophical issues. The thesis re-affirms the
importance of cultivating morally appropriate de-gendered emotions, particularly
compassion, and concludes with the proposal that we should incorporate and embed an
understanding of the emotions in the education curricula, for both pupils and those who
teach them. I propose, too, that emotions might be regarded as an architectonic capability
anchoring and influencing all other human capabilities.
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Contents
Chapter One: Emotions and Education.
1.1 Introduction. 7
1.2 Locating this Thesis. 8
1.3 Why Study Emotions? 13
1.4 Understanding Emotions - The Theoretical Approach. 19
a) Cognitivism. 19
b) Feelings. 23
c) Intelligence. 26
d) Rationality. 27
e) Emotions as Evaluative Judgements. 32
1.5 Emotions, Moral Education and Gender. 33
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis. 38

Chapter Two: What is an Emotion?
2.1 Introduction. 44
2.2 The General Structure of Emotions: Jealousy, Grief and Shame. 47
2.3 Emotions’ Characteristics, Components and Structure. 56
2.4 Intentionality. 60
2.5 Beliefs, Appraisals and Judgements. 64
2.6 Emotions’ Rationality and Intelligence. 72
2.7 Concluding Chapter Two. 83

Chapter Three: Compassion.
3.1 Introduction. 85
3.1a Dark Souls in a Heart of Darkness. 89
3.1b The Road. 92
3.2 Kantian Dignity, Compassionate Individuals. 95
3.3 Morphology of Compassion. 96
3.4 Other Regarding Emotions. 103
3.5 Just Institutions. 109
3.6 Concluding Chapter Three. 113

Chapter Four: Why an Ethic of Care Needs Moral Theory.
4.1 Introduction. 115
4.2 Care, Moral Reasoning and Universal Principles. 119
4.3 In Defence of Liberal Ideals. 124
4.4 The Importance of Care. 129
4.5 The Intrinsic Worth of the Individual. 131
4.6 Metaphors of Reason and Justice. 137
4.7 Rawls’ Moral Theory: Emotions and Moral Development. 139
4.8 Gendered Morality. 140
4.9 Concluding Chapter Four. 142

Chapter Five: Gendered Emotions.
5.1 Introduction. 149
5.2 Autonomy and Agency. 151
5.3 The Context for Gender Differences: The Field of Science. 162
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5.4 Gendering Emotions, Gendering Roles. 169
5.5 Concluding Chapter Five. 177

Chapter Six: Emotional Wellbeing - Threats and Capabilities.
6.1 Introduction. 178
6.2 Nancy’s Narrative: The Routes to Abuse. 181
6.3 The Emotional and Physical Effects of Intimate Partner Violence. 190
6.4 Capability Failure: The Capability Approach. 196
6.5 The Architectonic Potency of Emotions. 200
6.6 Concluding Chapter Six. 204

Chapter Seven: Moving Forward.
7.1 Introduction. 206
7.2 Summing-Up. 206
7.3 Teacher Education and Emotions in Schools. 215
7.3a The Novel as a Tool for Educating the Emotions. 217
7.4 Future Research. 233
7.5 Limitations of the Thesis. 234
7.6 Impact of the Thesis. 236
7.7 The Last Word … For the Moment. 239

References 240
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Acknowledgements

I thank:
• Jonathan for his support, patience and faith throughout this intellectual journey.
• My parents, Marilyn and Roddy, and my sister Ange, who wondered why I had waited
so long to do this.
• All my dear friends who never doubted me.
• The many pupils, like Nancy, whom I have taught over a twelve year period, and who
provided me with the ideas, opportunities for reflection and the inspiration to write
this thesis.
• Patrick Callaghan, Head Teacher of St. Andrew’s High School, Kirkcaldy, for his
natural sympathy and understanding that allowed me to attend conferences and take
time off to complete the PhD.
• The PESGB (Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain) for a grant that
enabled me to take a month off work to complete this thesis.
• Above all, Nicki Hedge, my supervisor. Without her unstinting support, faith, wisdom
and guidance, above all her patience, this thesis would not be what it is. Thank you.
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Author’s Declaration
I declare, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this
dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree
at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.
Signature:
Printed name: Alison MacKenzie

Abbreviations Used in this Thesis

Aristotle
NE. The Nicomachean Ethics
Rh. The Art of Rhetoric
Pol. The Politics

Conrad
HD Heart of Darkness

Kant
DV. The Doctrine of Virtue. The Metaphysics of Morals
GW. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Nussbaum
CA Capability Approach

Rawls
OP Original Position
VoI Veil of Ignorance

The Scottish Government
CfE Curriculum for Excellence
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Chapter One: Emotions and Education.

1.1 Introduction.
In this thesis I construct a predominantly philosophical account of emotions, and of
compassion in particular, premised on the view that emotions are often rational1 and
cognitive, and that they result from eudaimonistic2 judgements. Applying the study to
education generally, and to schools in particular, I shall argue that educational research has
not yet paid much attention to the construct of emotions, or to how an understanding of
emotions can help us to produce what, in Scotland, we now refer to as ‘successful learners,
responsible citizens, confident individuals and effective contributors’: the four capacities
of a Curriculum for Excellence (SEED, 2004). The aim of my research is to consider how
education can cultivate the emotions in ways that enable individuals to fulfill these four
capacities, developing healthy emotional landscapes in which all young people can ‘use’3
their emotions with discernment and sensitivity.

I shall attend, in particular, to the gendered emergence, expression and interpretation of
emotions, contending that a division of emotions along gender lines that are culturally and
socially constructed is damaging to, and limiting of, the potential of both sexes to flourish.
I shall do so against a background of theory and research that seems scant with respect to
how we might cultivate emotionally healthy individuals. It is not that emotional
intelligence is not recognised, it is. There is an extensive literature on it, especially as
popularised by Daniel Goleman (1996) and Howard Gardner (1983) and this is well-
known in Scottish schools4. However, the aim of such writers is to show us how to use (or
manage) emotions for intelligent interaction and behaviour modification rather than how to
cultivate emotionally healthy individuals or to provide a philosophical analysis of the

1I will shortly explain why I assert that emotions are often rational.
2I use eudaimonistic here following Nussbaum so taking it to refer to a person’s flourishing, wellbeing and
the ‘good’, with a meaning ‘compatible with as many distinct conceptions of what that good is as one cares
to propose’ (2001:31).
3I claim that we can ‘use’ emotions strategically to achieve our ends. We can ‘use’ anger to good effect if we
want our partner to take our grievance seriously, for example, or we can feign fear to convey danger to a
child. To ‘use’ here means focusing on the relevant thoughts to strategically arouse emotion or to evaluate
situations appropriately. See Greenspan (2000:475) who argues that ‘[a]ttention to emotions can induce the
reasons for an emotion can induce it – not with certainty but with enough regularity to provide the reasons
for a strategy. …So emotions do have an instrumental role to play in day-to-day practical rationality’. See
also Aristotle’s account of inducing emotional states in The Rhetoric. Aristotle’s discussion of emotion is
clearly appreciative of the rationality of emotion. We might also say we ‘manage’ emotions.
4Senior teachers or Deputes who wish to become Headteachers are expected to take the Scottish Qualification
for Headteachership (SQH) or the Fast Route to Head Teachership (FRH). Emotional Intelligence forms part
of these courses, and Goleman and Gardner are popular.
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emotions5. Bar-On et al. (2007) argue that emotionally intelligent people understand
themselves and others, are emotionally expressive, and can establish, develop and maintain
constructive relationships. Emotionally intelligent people are, further, successful: they can
bring about change in their social and working environments because they can manage
their emotions effectively. What is missing in such analyses is, at best, attention to how
one might become emotionally adept in order to be emotionally intelligent if, indeed,
emotional intelligence is a concept that has any significant value6. On the line I shall
develop, emotions are essential elements of human intelligence and wellbeing.
Accordingly, they deserve and demand more scrutiny and theoretical attention than
populist accounts provide if we are to educate young people who can enjoy emotional
wellbeing. This is the central issue the thesis seeks to address. However, before embarking
on a more detailed outline of the thesis, I shall pause, briefly, to locate the thesis in my life,
to explain how it came about, and to do so with an unashamedly personal, emotional
account of its emergence.

1.2 Locating this Thesis.
I am a girl from the Isle of Lewis, a remote island off the North West coast of Scotland,
where the Gaelic culture still survives and the Presbyterian Church holds sway. I had a
traditional, strict up-bringing in which belief in scripture and church attendance was the
norm. Until I was in my early teens, I never questioned either the church or faith in God
and, certainly, I did not question how women were supposed to behave. Women were
quietly spoken, very respectful and silent in church or when men were present in the house
during the Communions. While I often wore trousers, in church or when church guests
were visiting us, or we them, skirts and hats were obligatory, excess jewellery or make-up
was disapproved of and long hair was desirable. Men, I was brought up to believe, headed
households. Women’s work was in the home, and women, because of Eve’s seduction by
the serpent, had brought sin to the world, which justified our inferior status. However, for
me, Eve represented reason, a woman who asked ‘what if?’. Adam simply followed her,
without thought. Both had rested in a state of bliss and enchantment, feeling no fear, shame
or jealousy; no compassion, pity or sympathy. As a teenager grappling with the idea of a
beautiful Garden inhabited by only two people living a life of no moment until a snake slid

5However, Goleman does draw on Aristotelian philosophy.
6For a discussion of such concerns, see, for example, Carr (2000, 2002); Kristjansson (2001); Roberts et al.
(2001); Griffiths (2003); Rietti (2009).
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along to hiss his seductions to Eve, Eden seemed inexpressibly dull: an Edenic stupor.
‘What’s the point of having a mind?’, I asked. ‘Why put the tree there and say don’t eat
those apples?’, ‘Does God not understand the psychology of the creatures he created?’.
The answers that came back made no sense. In any case, it was Eve who was punished and
relegated to second class status, while Adam, who obeyed, ascended to the aristocracy.
Someone had to start it? But how unfair! And how convenient!
I have no brothers. I am confident, however, that were my parents to have had a son (and I
am very glad they did not), he would have been under the bonnet of the car and his sisters
would have been inside doing the housework. As it was, we were inside helping our
mother, something I became increasingly less willing to do, as I grew older, preferring
books to the kitchen sink. I am also confident that a brother would have been encouraged
to be a boy: boisterous, active, loud, into rock music and football. We girls were
encouraged to feel bad about being ‘angry’ and for not being ‘caring’ enough; in both
cases I failed to conform to what was expected. The division of emotional and intellectual
labour was also visible in school. The girls did ‘Home Economics’, as it was then called,
and the boys did Woodwork. It was no surprise when boys did well in Maths and Physics,
but surprising indeed if one of them was good at Languages or Literature. A girl was really
bright if she did well in Maths and a Science, and even more bright if she was good in all
Science and Mathematics subjects. I was ‘rubbish’7 at Maths, Chemistry and Physics, I
hated Home Economics, but I got along well with Biology and in most other subjects I
conformed to the gendered stereotype.

No-one, anywhere, challenged the view that women were different from men. I asked my
Dad why he did not stay at home and look after us while Mum went out to work and he
replied with the only reason he could: ‘That’s women’s work’. My mum thought my
question stupid, retorting: ‘I thought you were supposed to be intelligent?’. That was a
frequent response when I exasperated my parents with ‘all those blinking questions!’. My
concern grew about difference as it became apparent that double standards operated when
it came to what men and women could do in the realm of sexual expression. Why could the
boys get what they wanted, while the girls were labelled ‘sluts’ if they did? Because ‘boys
can’, is all I received in reply.

‘But why?’

7‘Rubbish’ is an informal and widely used expression that indicates how badly one fares in a subject or the
poor state of a skill. Pupils will very often say they are ‘rubbish at’ Maths, or Art or French.