Table Of ContentVerena Klappstein · Maciej Dybowski
Editors
Ratio Legis
Philosophical and Theoretical
Perspectives
Ratio Legis
(cid:129)
Verena Klappstein Maciej Dybowski
Editors
Ratio Legis
Philosophical and Theoretical Perspectives
Editors
VerenaKlappstein MaciejDybowski
FacultyofLaw,DepartmentforGerman DepartmentofLegalTheoryandPhilosophy
andEuropeanPrivateLaw,Civil AdamMickiewiczUniversityinPoznań
ProceduralLaw,andLegalTheory Poznań,Poland
ofProf.Dr.ThomasRiehm
UniversityofPassau
Passau,Germany
ISBN978-3-319-74270-0 ISBN978-3-319-74271-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74271-7
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Introduction
DuringtheXXVIIIWorldCongressoftheIVRinLisbon,16–21July2017,withthe
theme‘PeaceBasedonHuman Rights’,aspecialworkshopwas heldwith thetitle
‘IsThereaRatioLegisandifSo,HowManyAreThere?–TheMostPowerful
Method of Legal Reasoning Uncovered’. If you are German speaking, you will
knowthatthetitleisinspiredbyRichardDavidPrecht’swell-knownbookWerbin
ichundwennjawieviele(WhoamI,andifso,howmany).Infact,ratiolegisissuch
akaleidoscopeofdifferentmeaningsandaspectsofpossibleresearchtopics,suchas
reasonandrationality,legalinterpretationandargumentation,aswellaslegisticsand
legislation.
Withinthemethodoflegalinterpretationandlegalreasoning,bothbeingthemost
important of intellectual tools deployed by lawyers, ratio legis seems to be an
extremely powerful argument. Declaring the ratio legis of a statute can lead to a
U-turnargumentationthroughoutthelifespanofthestatuteitself—inparliament,in
practiceduringcourtsessions,whenitistestedagainsttheconstitution.Thoughthe
argumentfromratiolegisisusedwidely,muchaboutitremainstobeexamined.On
the general philosophical plan, there are many overlapping areas, which concern
differentapproachestohumanrationalityandtotheproblemsofpracticalreasoning.
Particular problems with ratio legis arise in the field of different accounts of legal
philosophyandtheory,especiallyasfarasmethodsofintellectualworkoflawyers,
with legal interpretation and argumentation in the first place, are concerned. These
problemscanbefurthersubdividedintoparticularaspectsofactivitiesundertakenby
lawyersandofficialswhousetheratiolegisintheirworkandunderlyingtheories.
Settingofffromscepticismregardingtheactualcontentofthetermratiolegisand
aconnected‘argumentfromratiolegis’,AdamDyrdaisinterestedintheuseofsuch
an argument as a ‘legislative’ action within the boundaries of practical legal dis-
course.ThelistofplatitudesaboutratiolegisleadsDyrdatonotingtheunrestricted
use of the term, which renders impossible a descriptive theoretical account of the
concept in legal discourse. The author concludes that it is much easier to construe
ratiolegisasanormativeargument,aslongasanyhopeforrevealingsomegeneral
conceptofratiolegisisabandoned.Dyrdaobservesthateveryinstanceoflabelling
v
vi Introduction
(wherebyitisclaimedthat‘TheratiolegisofthislegislativeactisX’)isinneedof
furtherjustification.
Marzena Kordela’s account of ratio legis as a binding legal value offers a
perspective on the axiological assumptions ascribed to the rational legislator
whose preferences are characterised by her as definite, hierarchically ordered and
formed into a relatively stable system. The author categorises rational legislator’s
values as legally binding values or extra-legal reference values or values of a
universal character that nonetheless belong to a given legal culture. Adopting this
analytical framework leads Kordela, first, to qualifying ratio legis as a value, and
moreoveralegallybindingone,and,second,todevelopingorderingcriteriaforsuch
rationes that can be used when law is being applied. Among such criteria, she
elaboratesthedegreeofapurpose’sgeneralisationandthelegalpowerofapurpose,
correspondingtothehierarchyofnormativesourcesinagivenlegalsystem.
Maciej Dybowski’s article explores the relationship between ratio legis and
practical reasoning, adopting as a point of departure the claim that conflicting
accounts of ratio legis are predominantly concerned with legal interpretation, at
theexpenseofpracticalreasoning.Theauthorestablishesconnectionbetweensuch
accounts and one-sided semantics. Dybowski identifies three types of one-sided
semantics and examines how they translate into respective accounts of legal inter-
pretation and ratio legis. This is followed by an alternative account based on
Brandom’sinferentialpragmatism,andamergerofsemanticsandpracticalreason-
inginlegaltheoryisdeveloped.Inthefinalpartofthechapter,theauthorteststhe
usefulness of inferential pragmatism in legal theory with regard to the problem of
ratiolegisandextendsaninferentialistaccountprovidedbyCanaleandTuzetbya
modelofagent’sactionsandreasonsandananalysisoftheirimpactonthereasoning
ofinterpretersanddecision-makers.
Whileremainingwithinthemethodologicalframeworkofthesame‘derivational’
conceptionoflegalinterpretation,MichałKrotoszyńskipointsoutanontologicalgap
between the rational lawmaker,as an ideal type, and actual legislators. Thisobser-
vationleadshimtoclarifyingtheuseoflegislativehistoryinvolvingratiolegisinthe
above-mentionedparadigmoflegalinterpretationandtosettingtheconditionsunder
whichlegislativehistorycanbedeployed.Krotoszyńskithusprovidesausefulcheck
for admissible reliance on legislative history where he includes public availability,
antecedentaccessibilityofalllegislativematerialstothemembersofthelegislative
bodyandasufficientdegreeofstraightforwardness.
VerenaKlappsteinexplorestheproblemofratiolegisfromaperspectiveofthe
influence exercised inthe moralphilosophy of Imanuel Kant on modern European
legal systems. She investigates the question whether Kant’s concept of purpose
could have any impact on the modern discourse of ratio legis, broadly understood
aslegalconsequenceandpurposeofalegalrule.Theauthorproceedsbyexplaining
differentaspectsofpurposeinconnectionwith,respectively,hypothetical,categor-
icalandlegalcategoricalimperative.Shealsooffersanaccountofclassesofduties.
Klappstein’s article provides an analytic Kantian framework, which can serve to
clarifyourdiscussionandunderstandingofpurposes,andassuchitcanbeadapted
toratiolegis.
Introduction vii
In his chapter, Nonconsequential Conception of Neutrality, Wojciech Ciszewski
dealswiththequestionofwhatitmeansforastatetobeneutral.Theconsequential
conceptionofstateneutralityrequiresthatpoliticalactionsequallyinfluencediffer-
ent conceptions of the good held by citizens in a given society. The
non-consequentialconception,whichpointstosomeunderstandingoftherationale
(orratiolegis)ofanaction,dependsonsomeaspectofapoliticalaction,otherthan
the effects that it causes. Ciszewski broadens our understanding of ratio legis by
offeringaclassificationofnon-consequentialconceptionsofneutrality,understood
as a general standard that forbids state officials from recognising and promoting
certain conceptions of the good. The justificatory neutrality points to the best
available justification of an action, the intentional neutrality indicates the motive
behindpoliticalagencyandtheexpressiveneutralityfocusesonhowtheobservers
perceiveanaction.Thelessonforestablishingthecontentofstateneutrality,which
hedrawsfromtheaboveclassification,isthatsuchcontentshouldbeapplicableto
individualcases,actionguidingandintuitivelyplausible.Seenfromthisperspective,
probably any ratio legis can be scrutinised by an anti-perfectionist (and
non-consequentialist)withregardtothesecriteria,inordertotestitscontent.
Teresa Chirkowska-Smolak andMarek Smolakdiscusstheproblemof imitative
ratiolegis,whichtheydefineasthepurposeofthelegislatorwhodoesnotintendfor
hisactivitytoproduceeffectsotherthanmereconvictionamongtheaddresseesthat
certain social problems have been ostensibly solved. Adopting as their point of
departurethethesisthatsuchostensibilityisinadmissible,atleastintheruleoflaw
tradition,theauthorsdiscussthreetypesofreasonsinsupportofsuchabelief,which
canbefoundinthephilosophyoflaw.However,astheyreveal,allofthesereasons
are based on certain assumptions concerning the existence of some kind of a
conventional-normative community of judges based on mutually shared moral
judgements and rationality. Chirkowska-Smolak and Smolak explain why judges’
moralreasoningcannotbecharacterisedasrationalandprovideanextensivesupport
forthisfromthefieldofexperimentalmoralpsychology.FollowingRondenOtter,
the authors argue for inadmissibility of imitative ratio legis from the perspective
based on public reasons. The arguments that they find plausible for refusing the
ostensibilityrefertoreasonsthatcouldnotberationallyquestionedorchallengedby
any reasonable sceptic, in which the latter would bear witness to his or her own
responsibilityforthecommunityofcitizens.
Konstanze von Schütz examines the notion of ratio legis as encountered in the
context of legal interpretation. She observes critically that prevalent approaches
conceiveofratiolegisasbelongingtoexternallydeterminedpurposesthat posited
legal norms seek to achieve. Schütz believes that under such approaches, law is
ultimatelyseenasdeprivedofanyrationalityatallandoffersanalternativeideaof
immanentlyrationallaw,inspiredbytheformalisttheoryofErnestJ.Weinrib.Her
account of this ‘Formalist’ conception of law, focusing on legal forms, coherence,
law'simmanentrationalityandimmanentintelligibility,providesthenecessarybasis
from which she further develops the idea of an immanent ratio legis, paying
particularattentiontolegalinterpretation.
viii Introduction
MikołajHermann’schapterdiscussestheinfluenceofratiolegisontheresultof
theinterpretationprocessandseekstodeterminetherelationbetweenthepurposive
(teleological) and linguistic or systemic rules of interpretation. His approach is
rooted in the so-called derivational conception of legal interpretation based on a
distinction between a legal provision and a legal norm. Following the tradition of
Poznańschooloflegaltheory,Hermannassociatesratiolegiswiththelawmaker’s
purpose of establishing a specific regulation. Such a purpose can be understood
instrumentally—as the configuration of social relations that should be achieved
through such a regulation—or axiologically—as the value that a given regulation
serves to protect or actualise. The author shows how the purposive rules affect the
result of an interpretation in each of its phases, which sheds the light on the
non-linearcharacteroftheprocessofinterpretation.Inparticular,Hermannanalyses
theimpact ofratiolegisonthesettlementofthecompetition oflegal provision,as
wellasthepossibleimpactontheinterpretiveresultsobtainedthroughthelinguistic
interpretation.
The following articles might shed some—colourful—light at the kaleidoscopic
term of ratio legis; however, many more of the different aspects still need to be
furtherexplored.
Passau,Germany VerenaKlappstein
Poznań,Poland MaciejDybowski
Contents
PartI WhatIsRatioLegis?
TheRealRatioLegisandWheretoFindIt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
AdamDyrda
RatioLegisasaBindingLegalValue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
MarzenaKordela
ArticulatingRatioLegisandPracticalReasoning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
MaciejDybowski
LegislativeHistory,RatioLegis,andtheConceptoftheRational
Legislator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
MichałKrotoszyński
PartII WhatCanRatioLegisBe?
TheConceptofPurposeinKant’sMetaphysicalElementsofJustice. . . 77
VerenaKlappstein
NonconsequentialConceptionofNeutrality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
WojciechCiszewski
IsThereanImitativeRatioLegis,andifso,HowManyAreThere?
PsychologicalPerspective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
TeresaChirkowska-SmolakandMarekSmolak
ix
x Contents
PartIII WhatPracticalImplicationsCanRatioLegisHave?
ImmanentRatioLegis?LegalFormsandStatutoryInterpretation. . . . . 161
KonstanzevonSchütz
HowCanRatioLegisHelpaLawyertoInterpretaLegalText?
EmployingthePurposeofaRegulationforLegalInterpretation. . . . . . 187
MikołajHermann
